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Abstract
This honors thesis examines the consequences of abandoning specific underlying
assumptions of economic models used to describe the distribution of goods among individual
agents or parties and the information about each one's preferences. In microeconomic theory, the
Edgeworth Box, Pareto-optimal trade, and convex (especially Cobb-Douglas) preference
structures are used to model the process in which consumers and producers make trade-off
choices that allocate limited resources among competing agents. This thesis investigates the
common underlying assumptions of these economic models by drawing upon mathematical
theory to develop both an analytical framework and the tools that help us establish boundaries
for these economic problems. The means of investigation involves extensive use of mathematical
reasoning and computer simulation. The main focus of this investigation is to determine the
consequences of relaxing the theoretical assumption stating that agents participating in Paretoefficient exchange always operate with complete and correct information. The objective is to first
determine the changes in Pareto optimization and price-setting that occur as a result of
differences in perception regarding marginal rates of exchange and then to determine which
trades are and are not Pareto-efficient.
Establishing Preference Structure through Utility Functions
The field of microeconomics studies individual economic behavior, which entails
individuals making trade-offs in order to distribute limited or scarce recourses among other
individual agents. A variety of models have been produced to describe how individual consumers
and producers make choices based on the established preferences of each agent, and given the
constraints imposed by the limited availability of resources. It is generally assumed that in light
of their preferences, consumers and producers choose from the set of affordable alternatives the
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one that will maximize their total satisfaction received from consuming or producing goods and
services. The array of preferences of the agents can be modeled mathematically by a nonnegative real valued utility function

, so that any combination of quantities of

n goods consumed or produced (referred to going forward as a bundle) will be mapped to an
assigned numerical value representing the resulting level of satisfaction, or utility, incurred.
Cobb-Douglas functions, of the form (

∏

(

, whose parameters

are non-negative

numbers which sum to one, are standard examples of such utility functions. This type of CobbDouglas function has an ideal functional form to work with because it has the following
properties:


U is a strictly monotonically increasing function. For every
U(



, the function mapping

to

) is strictly increasing.

U is continuous and differentiable; this generally only applies to the nonnegative domain
(except when one of the values of

is zero), but in this context that condition is usually

not relevant.


The preference relation induced by U is transitive. Specifically, the relation ‘is preferred
to’ that is defined by “bundle X is preferred to bundle Y if and only if U(X) ≥ U(Y)” is
transitive. This is a trivial result of the monotonicity of the function and the standard
ordering of the real domain and codomain.



The model observes the law of diminishing returns, also known as the law of diminishing
marginal utility. The marginal utility of a good
every additional unit of

is the additional utility gained for

acquired. Mathematically, the marginal utility

the partial derivative of U with respect to

. Let

of xi is

denote an increase in good i

consumed or produced, so that some bundle A is represented by the vector
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(

(

and B represented by

diminishing returns, for every variable

, if

. Then, by the law of
denotes an increase in commodity i

consumed or produced, then holding the quantities of other goods j constant, the marginal
gain from increasing

is less when bundle B is owned than when A is owned (i.e.,

(

(

(

). Featured in Figure 1 is a

graph of a cross-section of a bi-variable Cobb-Douglas function with a fixed y value; for
all x > 0, as x increases, U increases, but at a decreasing rate, as evidenced by the graphed
curve’s downward concavity.
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Figure 1. A cross section of (
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Returns to scale are constant; this is often described as a situation where doubling of all
quantities consumed or inputs will result in doubling utility or output, respectively
(Nicholson and Snyder 226). This is a result of the parameters

summing to one

(Fuleky).


For constant returns to scale, the marginal utilities are never negative and the utility
function does not attain a maximum. For each commodity i, the marginal utility of
decreases and converges to zero as its ith argument increases without bound.
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Horizontal cross sections (or contours) of the surfaces plotted by this family of functions
are convex with respect to the origin of the domain space. Any line segment whose
endpoints are two points lying on such a cross section will always remain inside the
region whose lower bound is the cross section (Boyd and Vandenberghe 67). An example
of what such a cross section looks like can be seen in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. This contour of a Cobb-Douglas function is a convex curve.

Isoquants are sets of bundles X on the domain of the utility function which yield equal
amounts of utility

:

two bundles on some set

(

. The individual, given a choice between

, is indifferent between each, since neither is considered preferable to

the other. Thus, isoquants are often called “indifference curves” (Nicholson and Snyder 60).
Figure 3 provides an example of a contour graph of a bi-variable Cobb-Douglas function
displaying these curves; the curves shown represent sets of the graphed surface for which the
vertical coordinate, corresponding to utility, stays constant (hence the name “isoquant”). Since
the function is monotonically increasing in all directions, contours further from the origin
correspond to higher levels above the XY plane.
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Figure 3. A contour graph of (

√

.

While each bundle on an isoquant will each yield identical degrees of utility, different
bundles are associated with different marginal rates of substitution; a marginal rate of
substitution between two goods is defined as the quantity of one commodity i that an individual
is willing to trade for a unit of some other commodity j. In the special case where there are only
two commodities available for consumption, the marginal rate of substitution between two goods
x and y is generated by taking the ratio between two first-order partial derivatives of the relevant
utility function (where the notation for each partial derivative is MU, for “marginal utility”);
, by the chain rule (Nicholson and Snyder 62); the motivation for this is
rooted in the notion that an individual will want to optimize the proportion of the desirability of
additional y relative to that of additional units of x. The resulting

is then representative of the

ratio between instantaneous marginal utilities of goods x and y, and is also the effective slope, or
rate of change, between x and y, holding U constant. In the models used here, the convexity of
the isoquants ensures that the marginal rate of substitution tends to be more extreme for more
unbalanced bundles.
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Figure 4. The convexity of the isoquants ensures that extreme bundles result in extreme marginal rates of exchange.

This can be seen in Figure 4 above, where the relative steepness of the line tangent to the
highlighted isoquant I at bundle B, which has much more of y than x (so that x becomes more
desirable), and relative flatness of the one tangent to I at C, which has much more of x than y
(making y more desirable), stand in contrast to the tangent line at balanced bundle A, whose
slope’s absolute value is close to 1, corresponding to a one-to-one relationship between the
relative exchangeability between x and y.
When examining individual consumer or producer utility, if price levels of all goods are
already determined (if not at least relative price levels, in situations where there is no purely
monetary medium of exchange), then a linear constraint can be established whose upper bound is
determined by how much “currency” the individual has, and whose steepness is determined by
the relative market prices between each pair of exchangeable goods.
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Figure 5. A linear budget constraint, and the optimal isoquant with which it intersects.

In the simple case with a market of only two goods, as seen in Figure 5, this constraint, which
acts as a budget constraint for a consumer and a type of production frontier for a producer, has a
boundary whose slope takes the form of the price ratio between goods x and y:

(Nicholson

and Snyder 69).
Given an economy in which at least one good functions as some form of commodity
money, or given that there is some form of currency, each commodity i’s unit price

can be

defined independently of other goods j (with the exception of the commodity k playing the role
of commodity money if truly liquid cash does not exist). If the above axiom holds, then
consumer equilibrium is met when the ratio of marginal utility of xi to each price of xi is the
same for every xi:
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This then implies that for each pair of commodities i and j,

results in

, which immediately

, for each i and j available in the market (Nicholson and Snyder 73). Thus, as

shown in Figure 4, consumer equilibrium is satisfied if and only if that person has acquired a
bundle of goods (e.g. the solid black dot in Figure 4 for which (x,y)=(2,2)) for which the
boundary of the individual’s constraint is perfectly tangential to the corresponding indifference
curve.
The Edgeworth Box as a Model for Trade
The earlier assumption of established price levels ends up begging the question of how
they might be established in the first place. This is where the Edgeworth box model becomes
relevant; rather than pitting the individual’s preference contours against some perfectly linear
budget constraint, one could instead pit it against those of another individual (or those of many,
in the general case). Then the marginal rates of exchange for the second individual are like
starting price levels for trade from which the first can negotiate. The Edgeworth box is used to
model the allocation of goods resulting from negotiation between or among parties. There exist a
fixed number of active participants m in some closed economy, where there are a fixed number
of goods available for distribution n (In the simplest case, the one which receives the most
consideration here due to its relative simplicity, (m,n) = (2,2).). All m parties start with initial
bundles

, where

(

), for each ith individual (for the purposes

of this project, assume that for each individual, the initial bundle is generated from the tangency
between some production utility function and some production possibilities frontier behaving as
a productive linear budget constraint). Furthermore, the total amount of each good available, at
least initially, is assumed to be determined by the (vector) sum of initial bundles. For any given

Bernard 9
trade, all reallocations of goods between parties are Pareto-efficient; redistribution occurs among
some subset of the group of parties in the economy only if it is believed or known that marginal
utility of redistribution is nonnegative for both/all trading parties in that group of agents. Given
that each party’s preference structure satisfies the Cobb-Douglas properties outlined earlier, this
means that reallocation occurs only if no party has to give up anything, or if each party gets back
more than (s)he would have to give up. Every individual is assumed to be able to negotiate and
trade with every other individual with no transaction costs or barriers to entry.
The space in which this trading activity occurs can be described as a cross-product of the
domain spaces of the utility functions

, where vector A = (

) lies on this cross

product and represents all combinations of quantities possessed by every individual. Figure 5
shows an Edgeworth box modeling the potential trading behavior in a closed two-person
economy with only two commodities available for trade. Given some initial allocation (
and utility functions

and

, the Edgeworth box is set up so that the isoquants

(corresponding to the utility level of
(

)

(

) and

(corresponding to the utility level of

) are heuristically diametrically arranged, forming a convex blue region, whose two

boundaries intersect at (

). This illustrates that anything owned by one individual is out of

the reach of the other without some sort of trade. Also,

, if presented near the upper-right

corner of the box, implies the first individual is wealthy while the second individual is
considered wealthier when

is near the bottom-left corner. The interior of the convex blue

region is the region of reallocation points for which utility increases for both parties, and its
boundaries consist of reallocations for which one party’s net gains are nearly maximized and for
which the other party’s utility stays constant.
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Figure 6. An Edgeworth box with two participants, and two goods available for trade.

As a result of the convexity of the individuals’ preference structures, any allocation of
goods can thus only converge inside the interior of the subspace of the Edgeworth box bounded
by isoquants

corresponding to the current allocations

(Autor). Here, it is assumed that

initially, if the quantity 1 represents 100% of any good j available, then it must hold that for
every such j, for each individual i, ∑

(that is, the sum of all quantities owned by

every individual is 100% of that good available in the market); perhaps more importantly this
condition holds when reallocation is Pareto-optimal. This allows

and

to overlap on the

two-dimensional Edgeworth box at all times, ensuring that if total outputs

(quantity produced

of good x) and

are complements

(quantity produced of good y) are known, then

such that knowing one is sufficient to compute the other (i.e.,

and
(

)

).
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Since the availability of all unclaimed goods are exhausted, in order for one person to
gain it would require at least one other to give something up. When Pareto-efficient trade or
reallocation is no longer possible, the distribution of goods is considered Pareto-optimal
(Nicholson and Snyder 362). The set of all Pareto-optimal allocations in an Edgeworth box is
known as a contract curve (such as the bright green curve in Figure 6), defined as the set of all
allocations (

) for which one of the ith individual’s marginal utility

can be

positive only if there is some other jth individual for which at least one of that individual’s
marginal utilities

is negative. The contract curve can also be defined as the set of all

intersections between mutually optimal, and thus tangential, isoquants (the only nonempty
intersections by definition), written

(⋂

(⋂

(Nicholson and Snyder

362-363). A few of these tangencies can be seen in Figure 6.
The aforementioned “set of nonempty intersections of isoquants” definition of the
contract curve is important, because the contract curve must then be a set which determines the
range of possible equilibrium price levels between goods. Similar to the tangency between the
optimal isoquant against a budget constraint featured in Figure 5, the slope of the line tangent to
isoquants in an Edgeworth box after Pareto optimization should determine relative price levels
between goods. Now, let this miniature economy’s market of interest be a free one, such that no
transaction produces externalities, the market is perfectly competitive, there are no transaction
costs, and all participants are fully informed. Then according to the First Welfare Theorem, if
those conditions hold, when the market is in equilibrium, it must also be Pareto efficient (Autor).
Furthermore, the Second Welfare Theorem states that if preferences are convex (as outlined
earlier), Pareto efficient allocations can be market equilibria (Autor). The result of these
assumptions is that the set of available Pareto improvements (the blue space in the above
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example), given some initial allocation, will contain some subset of market equilibria. Since the
contract curve is defined as the set of all allocations for which relative prices between goods are
agreed upon, the set of Pareto optimal allocations must then equal the set of allocations for which
market equilibria (and thus universally agreed-upon price levels) are established.
Consider a scenario in which two individuals gather or produce two types of resources in
a Robinson-Crusoe-style closed economy where by definition each individual acts as both
consumer and producer (Miron). If the conditions required by the First Welfare Theorem are
satisfied, this will result in the two individuals negotiating with each other, and ultimately trading
such that a Pareto-optimal reallocation is the result, and equilibrium (relative) market price levels
are established. This, of course, would then allow an outside observer to monitor changes in
quantities produced and in price levels for each good after each cycle of consumption and
production. This grants sufficient information needed to calculate this economy’s periodic
nominal GDP, which is the sum of products of quantity and price level of each good, written
∑

(Mankiw 21). Tracking GDP, furthermore, allows for monitoring of economic

growth and recession, given that one could adjust it for inflation. By the Keynesian IS-LM
model, GDP, when in equilibrium with planned aggregate expenditures, can be considered
equivalent to aggregate income so that whenever the GDP is decreasing recession is more likely,
and that increasing GDP implies probable recovery or growth (Mankiw 275).
However, this is all assuming that no individual is interested in any economic activity
other than completely honest and procedurally fair behavior. Neither individual is assumed to be
willing to lie, cheat, or steal so that (s)he is at an unfair advantage. At least initially, it is not
assumed that each individual is interested in gaining, then exploiting, an inequitable amount of
wealth or market power. Depending on each individual’s preference structure and productivity,
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however, an initially free market could easily become unbalanced over time; after all, if for some
reason the negotiation procedure preceding reallocation repeatedly results in one individual
gaining more than the other, while each negotiation session yields a Pareto-optimal result, it will
not result in any substantial redistribution of wealth, if any at all. As a matter of fact, a scenario
in which one individual has everything and the other has nothing, Pareto optimality is satisfied
(ignoring the issues raised by possible violations of continuity and differentiability at the extreme
corners of the Edgeworth box, assume the contract curve includes these corners) (Autor). Thus,
the wealthy individual will not agree to trade anything with the poor one unless the poor one can
offer something perceived to be of at least equal value. Also, an initially free market, given
individual production frontiers for which the cost of producing x for one individual is relatively
low and the cost of producing y is relatively low for the other individual, can be expected to
result in an asymmetric market where each individual ends up specializing in the production of
one commodity because the differences in costs of production create comparative advantages in
production.
Simulating Pareto Optimization with Mathematica
In order to answer questions about the short-term and long-term behavior of individuals
with Cobb-Douglas preferences always willing to trade in a Pareto-efficient manner, attempts
were made to develop an algorithm to simulate the production and consumption behaviors of
such individuals. In this simulation programmed using Mathematica, a set of initial conditions
for each individual is established, and for the sake of simplicity, the simulation is limited to a
closed two-person economy in which only two commodities can be produced and are available
for consumption. Each individual is assigned two utility functions, one of which is associated
with utility of production, and the other associated with consumer utility, each respectively
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satisfying the form (
each

, and each

∏

and (

(

∏

(

, with parameters A, B,

being randomly generated.

Unfortunately, due to problems arising from the need to debug the program before it
works properly, and because of time constraints, at the time of writing the desired recursive
program remains unfinished. An already existing Mathematica program modeling the Edgeworth
box, written by Seth J. Chandler, was found, and for reasons yet unknown uses a slightly
different functional form, (

√

√ (the image produced for Figure 6 was

generated by Chandler’s program).

Figure 7. On the left: contour graph of a function satisfying Chandler’s form specifically (
On the right: contour graph of a function in the Cobb-Douglas form, specifically (

√

√ .

.

Like the Cobb-Douglas form, this sum of square roots produces a functional form which is
monotonically increasing in all directions and allows for a set of convex isoquants. Interestingly,
the results of changing the coefficients of these square roots has, at first glance, a similar effect
to manipulating the powers of x and y in the Cobb-Douglas model. As seen in Figure 7, one of
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the differences between these two approaches is that the Cobb-Douglas functional form seems
likely to yield lower utility for highly imbalanced bundles than the form used by Chandler. The
placement of contours in the Cobb-Douglas form are such that they tend to touch neither axis but
rather asymptotically approach them, whereas in Chandler's form, contours appear to actually
touch at least one axis for some finite quantity owned of some good.
Simulating Market Scenarios with an Incorrectly Estimated Preference Structure
As a result of difficulties arising from quantitative interpretation of Chandler’s visual
style of output, and its lack of an option for numeric inputs, it becomes necessary to simply
reason mathematically to anticipate the differences between a perfectly free-market scenario
where all parties are fully informed and one in which asymmetric information is a non-negligible
problem. One way of modeling the emergence of imperfect information would be to assume at
least one party incorrectly estimates their marginal utilities of exchange; then the expected result
might deviate from the ideal one, so that the partially uninformed individual might gain less from
trade as the result of either the second party’s willingness to exploit the first party’s ignorance, or
as a result of the second party’s ignorance of the first party’s ignorance.
To examine this phenomenon, assume both individuals’ true consumer preferences are
governed by two-dimensional Cobb-Douglas functions of the form
(

(

and

, which as oulined earlier satisfy the convexity properties required to satisfy

the Second Welfare Theorem. Then to set up the Edgeworth box, the second individual’s utility
function must be transformed so that its contours are translated by the vector of total quantities of
each good produced (

, due to the functional form’s symmetry with respect to the origin.

Then the resulting functional form is

(

(

(

(with the negative
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sign included to ensure that the utility is positive and increasing as x and y decrease, since x and y
correspond to the amount

owned by the first individual). Then by the tangency definition of

the contract curve, the contract curve must then be the real solution to the differential equation
(

( (

(

(

( (

(

(

, which is, according to Mathematica,

. Assuming an exhaustive distribution of goods (i.e., no surplus),

where the first party owns (p,q) and the second owns (

, the set of available

Pareto-optimal allocations will be bounded by the intersection of the contract curve
(

(
isoquants (

and the convex subregion of the Edgeworth box bounded by

(

and (

(

(

(

,

which are the isoquants intersecting at (p,q). Then each bound of the relevant segment of the
(

contract curve can be found by solving
(

√

(

√

(

and

, respectively (unfortunately, Mathematica is not able to

solve either of these general equations since the form of the solution depends on

). In Figure 8,

the two points intersecting the contract curve (dark yellow) and each of the isoquants (blue and
purple) are the real solutions to two special cases of the aforementioned two equations. If the
final reallocation ends up on point A, then the second individual’s gains are maximized within
the set of Pareto improvements (light blue) and the first individual gains nothing, and if the final
reallocation ends up on point B, the first individual’s gains are maximized and the second
individual gains nothing. Regardless of how much each party gains, a Pareto-optimal allocation
must lie somewhere on the segment of the contract curve between points A and B (orange).
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Figure 8. Two isoquants, forming the boundaries of the set of Pareto improvements and part of the contract curve.

Now, presume the first party is for some reason sufficiently ignorant of their own utility
that the isoquant (

(

is incorrectly estimated to be an isoquant

determined by some transformation of the correct Cobb-Douglas form. A problem quickly arises
when one simply tries to change the parameter

while keeping p, q, and thus the current level

of utility

fixed; as it turns out, for any

equations

,

is

,

, the only solution to the system of
. Then the transformation warrants an

additional step, involving addition of the inputs x and y by arbitrarily chosen quantities m and n
(though with the restriction that (

; this is necessary to keep the

ordered pair inside the relevant domain). So the false first utility function becomes
(

(

(

, such that

(

(

and

, reflecting an

assumption that in order for the first party to be unaware that they are incorrect about their true
preference, they must yield the same level of utility from possessing (

as designated by both

the correct and incorrect function. An immediate consequence of setting

(

(

is
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that a specific value can usually be found for
(

yields

)
(

, or

(
(

; solving the aforementioned equality for

, implying that if

or either

, then this transformation will not work, as

,

will be undefined.

Depending on which values of m and n are chosen, the first party will either
underestimate or overestimate the boundary of the convex trading space closer to that
individual’s “origin” (the corner of the Edgeworth box for which that individual has nothing). In
a situation where the second party is aware of the first party’s ignorance, depending on the nature
of the first party’s ignorance this can provide either an advantage or a disadvantage to the second
party during negotiation. If the first party believes their isoquant to have a curve further from the
origin than it really is, but the second party knows where it really lies, then there are a few
different possibilities: if the second party is honest and establishes the true location of their
isoquant, either the available trading space shrinks so that the ignorant party can grant itself
leverage by insisting on maintaining their established lower bound, or the trading space is
restricted to the starting point, where each party is made to believe that mutually beneficial trade
is impossible since they cannot agree on the correct location of the contract curve. While the true
contract curve is defined as the values of (x,y) for which

(

, the

incorrect one that the first party would have to believe is correct (to remain consistent) is found
by solving
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(

)
(

((
(

)
(

((

(
(

(

(
(

)
(

(
(

)
(

(

(
(
(
(

( (

(

( (

(

, whose solution

(
(

(

(

(

becomes

(

(

(

(

(

(

.

Figure 9. One party incorrectly underestimates their potential gains.

Figure 9 features an example of a scenario where one individual, whose “origin” is on the
bottom left believes their isoquant to be further from the bottom left corner than it is (the true
isoquant here is blue, the false one green). As a result, this first individual will believe the set of
Pareto improvements (lime green) to be a subset of what it really is (lime green and sky blue). If
the second individual is unaware that the first is incorrectly communicating their preference
structure, then Pareto-efficient negotiation must occur within the smaller trading space, and the
final allocation must lie somewhere on the false contract curve, between points A and B; this
guarantees a net gain for the first individual that they would not know about. If the second
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individual knows the first individual’s real preference structure, then they can choose to either
inform the first person of their true preference structure (thereby establishing the true contract
curve), or negotiate under the pretense of symmetric information. In this case, being honest
might backfire for the second individual, because the first might insist on setting their minimum
Pareto-optimal allocation at point C as a result of some irrational cognitive bias (similar to the
“anchoring” bias described by Kahneman and Taversky). For the initially misinformed
individual, ending up in the blue region feels like a “loss” due to having the green isoquant as an
initial reference point. Point B, meanwhile, appears to yield a higher maximum gain for the
second party, even if it isn’t truly Pareto-optimal; then it might be in the interest of the second
party to acknowledge as correct the delusions of the first.

Figure 10. The first party mistakenly believes the initial allocation to be Pareto-optimal.

In an extreme case, as seen in Figure 10, the first party might mistake an initial allocation
for a Pareto-optimal one. In the example below, the first party greatly has most of y but little of x,

Bernard 21
and greatly underestimates the value of additional units of x in terms of units of y, mistakenly
assuming that this is an acceptable market price level. The second party, meanwhile, who has
most of x but little of y, recognizes that both parties stand to gain a lot through trading (with the
region of Pareto improvements being considerably large). In this case the second party’s only
rational option would be to attempt to convince the first party that they have incorrectly
estimated their own preference structure. If the first party disagrees and is stubborn, the second
party has no hope of improving their utility.
Alternatively, the ignorance of the first party can be a boon for the second; in a scenario
where the ignorant party underestimates the quantity lying on the contract curve to which they
would be indifferent to with respect to the initial allocation, the second party, if unaware of their
leverage, could easily negotiate with the first party so that the first actually ends up worse off
than initially (the same result would be expected if the second party knew the first party’s true
indifference curve, and then out of self-interest exploited this fact, especially if the false contract
curve generated by the first party’s ignorance yields a much higher potential net gain for the
second party). Of course, in this scenario Pareto-efficient trade, and in turn Pareto optimization,
are still possible and plausible; nevertheless it is not guaranteed. For instance, Figure 11 presents
a scenario in which the first individual greatly overestimates potential gains; the set of true
Pareto improvements is limited to the light blue space, but the first party mistakes the pink
region as being part of the set of Pareto improvements. As mentioned already, if the second party
is behaving in their own self-interest first and foremost, they will trade with the first party under
the pretense of Pareto optimization, using the false contract curve. The result is that the set of
final reallocations will lie on the region of the contract curve between points B and C, with
almost this entire segment lying in the pink region. Only the reallocations between points C and
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D entail true gains for both parties, but the true gains are marginal for both parties; therefore,
since the second party has the opportunity to gain much more, it is unlikely for the final
reallocation to end up there. If the second party knows the first party to be incorrect, the
opportunity cost of being truthful (in other words, the cost of not lying) is substantial enough for
it to be almost foolish to forgo potentially reaching point B rather than limiting maximum gains
to point A.

Figure 11. The first party suffers the risk of bearing losses under the false pretense that they are real gains.

Conclusions; Closing Remarks
Since relative price levels between goods are determined by the tangential intersections
of indifference curves corresponding to each point on the contract curve, incorporating
inaccurate information about one party’s own preference structure will change the way prices are
set. Thus the range of possible prices that can be set is changed as well. This is most obvious in
the case where at least one party believes the starting allocation to already be Pareto-optimal; this
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leads that individual to draw the false conclusion that the resulting set of relative prices are fair
market equilibrium prices, when demand from other individuals might suggest otherwise. The
resulting market failure demonstrates that the First Welfare Theorem is not merely vacuously
true; while the starting allocation behaves effectively as a market equilibrium, it is not truly
Pareto-optimal.
Based on the aforementioned definition of nominal GDP (that is, the sum of products of
unit price and quantity produced), differences in the final price levels from truly Pareto-optimal
ones will result in very different measures of nominal GDP. In a simulation incorporating
consumption and production cycles, the resulting difference in allocation will change how each
agent produces additional units in the future; in the bi-variable case, if for instance one party had
more of x and less of y, then assuming that party did not specialize in production of x, they would
be more likely to produce y due to its relative scarcity. Meanwhile, if trade is restricted due to
one’s insistence on the existence of fewer Pareto-efficient reallocations than there are, nominal
GDP (at least at that time) could be greatly distorted, possibly to the point of broadcasting
expansion when recession is truly occurring. If periodic inflation could be tracked, one could
more accurately observe just how much the economy either prospers or suffers relative to a
situation where information is not problematic and trade is thus always truly Pareto-efficient. On
the other hand, cases where one individual becomes wealthy and the other poor as a result of bad
information are unlikely to be seen as problematic from the aggregative perspective (since all
quantities owned are added up regardless of distribution). However, wealth disparity can very
quickly emerge in the situations where one party is made worse off due to incorrectly identifying
detrimental reallocations as mutual marginal gains.
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